Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Collins, Sean M.; James, Duncan
• 署名单位: Fordham University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.005
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 117-136
• 关键词: information; Choice Under Risk; auctions; experiment

摘要

Highest stoppage games in economics-first price sealed bid auction and Dutch auction, among others-have produced striking puzzles, including violation of revenue equivalence between auctions and adjustment of behavior across interfaces. The latter is also observed in risk elicitation. Here, we use existing puzzles to shed light on each other, by nesting auction and risk tasks in a common environment. We find behavior consistent with a spatial interface imparting the same relevant auction -theoretic surplus and probability information as does an interactive numerical calculation tool. Empirical revenue equivalence (respectively, risky choice) can thus be altered by design.