Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Rincke, Johannes; Schudy, Simeon
• 署名单位: Deutsche Bundesbank; Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Erlangen Nuremberg; Ulm University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 179-190
• 关键词: Cheating; Lying; Truth-telling; Compliance; COMMITMENT; No-cheating rule; No-cheating declaration; Commitment request

摘要

Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.