CIVIL INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION - CONCEPTS, CRITIQUE AND MODELS

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: BASU, K
• 署名单位: Delhi School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00046-F
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 19-33
• 关键词: evolution; games; CIVIL NORMS; institutions

摘要

The paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution. The survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection. The sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties. This paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions. It then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games. It is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one. Since it is the latter that is of interest to economists, an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games.