Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cavatorta, Elisa; Guarino, Antonio; Huck, Steffen
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London; University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.005
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 292-307
• 关键词: Social learning; experiment; Partial observability; information aggregation; Informational cascades

摘要

In our information cascade experiments, we study social learning in decision-making situations in which decisions not to do are unobservable. Subjects, in sequence, choose whether to invest or not, without knowing their position. They observe a private signal and the number of investments made by their predecessors, but not how many predecessors have chosen not to invest. We find that down cascades, in which agents neglect the signal and do not invest, occur, in contrast with the equilibrium predictions. Up cascades, in which agents invest independently of the signal, occur, but less than in equilibrium.