A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonifacio, A. G.; Inarra, E.; Neme, P.
• 署名单位: Universidad Nacional de San Luis; University of Basque Country; University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-22
• 关键词: Coalition formation; Absorbing set; Reduced form of a game; Convergence to stability

摘要

Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a reduced form of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.