Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabrales, Antonio; Hauk, Esther
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.006
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 138-161
• 关键词: Leadership; NORMS; Local interaction; networks

摘要

In this paper, we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, along with the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto-dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto-dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions of which leader should be removed and how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff-dominant play.