Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Puja; Rampal, Jeevant
• 署名单位: University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.017
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 467-492
• 关键词: Contests; Group behavior; collective action; asymmetry

摘要

We examine behavior in a two -stage group contest where intra-group contests are followed by an inter -group contest. Rewards accrue to the winning group, with winners of the intra-group contest within that group receiving a greater reward. The model generates a discouragement effect, where losers from the first stage exert less effort in the second stage than winners. In contrast to the related literature, we show that a prior win may be disadvantageous, generating lower profits for first stage winners as compared to losers. We consider exogenous asymmetry between groups arising from a biased group contest success function. Although the asymmetry occurs in the second stage, its effect plays out in the first stage, with higher intra-group conflict in the advantaged group. Experimental results support the qualitative predictions of the model. However, losers from the first stage bear a higher burden of the group contribution than the theoretical prediction.