Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kalai, Ehud
• 署名单位: OpenAI; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.011
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 378-394
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; Dominant strategy equilibrium; Faulty players; Social contract

摘要

Strategic interactions pose central issues that are not adequately explained by the traditional concepts of dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), Nash equilibrium (NE), and their refinements. A comprehensive analysis of equilibrium concepts within the von Neumann -Nash framework of n -person optimization reveals a decreasing hierarchy of n nested concepts ranging from DSE to NE. These concepts are defined by the critical mass, the number of players needed to adopt and sustain the play of a strategy profile as an equilibrium. In games with n > 2 players, the n - 2 intermediate concepts explain strategic issues in large social systems, implementation, decentralization, as well as replication studied in economics, operations management, and political games.