Guard labor

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Jayadev, Arjun; Bowles, Samuel
• 署名单位: University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Boston; University of Siena
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.009
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 328-348
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; property rights; comparative institutions; INEQUALITY; guard labor

摘要

We explore the economic importance of the private and public exercise of power in the execution of contracts and defense of property rights. We define power and represent it in a model of growth in a modem capitalist economy, borrowing themes from the classical economists (unproductive labor, profit-driven investment), Marx (the labor disciplining effect of unemployment), and the contemporary theory of incomplete contracts (the role of monitoring and enforcement rents). We use this model to identify the resources devoted to the exercise of power, which we term guard labor as we measure these in labor units. Data from the United States indicate a significant increase in its extent in the U.S. over the period 1890 to the present. Cross-national comparisons show a significant statistical association between income inequality and the fraction of the labor force that is constituted by guard labor, as well as with measures of political legitimacy (inversely) and political conflict. Some observations on the welfare implications of guard labor conclude the paper. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.