Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ahlin, Christian; Bose, Pinaki
• 署名单位: University of Memphis; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.12.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 465-486
• 关键词: bribery; Allocation efficiency; bureaucratic delay; CORRUPTION

摘要

We examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy. The presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants. Consequently, efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses, or may never receive licenses, as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them. An increase in the proportion of honest officials, while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions, can also induce greater inefficiencies (misallocation and delay) from corrupt officials. As a result, social welfare may be non-monotonic in the proportion of honest officials, and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption. Competition between officials can hurt efficiency; its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants' ability to pay bribes. (C) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.