IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura
• 署名单位: University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Florence
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.01.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 640-666
• 关键词: IMF programmes; CONDITIONALITY; incomplete information; reputation; dynamic panel

摘要

In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might exp, lain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982-2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.