BANK HETEROGENEITY, REPUTATION AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FERNANDEZ, R; KAARET, D
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2526983
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 61-78
• 关键词: sovereign-debt; repudiation

摘要

This paper examines a process of debt renegotiation in which banks possess divergent interests and there is asymmetric information. We assume that large banks must exert pressure on small banks in order to obtain participation of these in the provision of new money and in debt forgiveness. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the effect of asymmetric information as to the amount of pressure that large banks can exert on small banks makes the debtor countries worse off than absent these asymmetries in information. This also provides a rationale for the growing popularity of exit bonds.