WARRANTIES WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO MARKET PARTICIPATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BIGELOW, J; COOPER, R; ROSS, TW
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2526951
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 85-100
• 关键词: Coordination games; product; QUALITY; FAILURE

摘要

The provision of product warranties when the exit of firms is possible is an example of a more general contracting problem without full commitment. When firms cannot precommit to future market participation, they ran exit if continued participation is not profitable, thereby avoiding outstanding warranty obligations. Incentives for market participation come from future profits which depend on future sales. The resulting intertemporal linkage between cohorts of consumers may create multiple, Pareto-ordered equilibria. The possibility of multiple equilibria is examined for alternative market structures as is the government's role in influencing the selection of an equilibrium.