OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGY IN MARKETING-RESEARCH CONSULTING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: CHANG, CH; LEE, CWJ
• 署名单位: Tulane University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2527064
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 463-478
• 关键词: information acquisition; cournot; oligopoly; duopoly

摘要

This paper studies the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolistic marketing research consultant who sells high-cost proprietary marketing information to her oligopolistic clients in the manufacturing industry. In designing an optimal pricing strategy, the consultant needs to fully consider the behavior of her clients, the behavior of the existing and potential competitors to her clients and the behavior of her clients' customers. We show how the environment uncertainty, the capability of clients' internal research department, and the number of potential clients can affect the optimal pricing scheme.