ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ESPINOSAVEGA, MA; YIP, CK
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2527059
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 383-396
• 关键词: deterrence; entry

摘要

The motivation of this paper rests on the attempts by some groups of countries to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Implicit in these attempts is the notion that coordination by at least some countries is better than zero coordination. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of international coordination to study the properties of a partial coordination scheme. We find that, indeed, some coordination is Pareto superior to zero coordination. Although a free-riding incentive problem arises in partial coordination schemes, such schemes are sustainable provided the relative size of the coalition is chosen ''appropriately.''