WHY INDUSTRIAL-POLICIES FAIL - LIMITED COMMITMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KARP, LS; PERLOFF, JM
• 署名单位: University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2527264
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 887-905
• 关键词: dynamic oligopoly; Export subsidies; price-competition; optimal trade; MARKET; TECHNOLOGY; monopoly; Rivalry; COSTS; MODEL

摘要

The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.