On the persistence of leadership or leapfrogging in international trade

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Motta, M; Thisse, JF; Cabrales, A
署名单位:
Universite Catholique Louvain; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
刊物名称:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0020-6598
DOI:
10.2307/2527217
发表日期:
1997
页码:
809-824
关键词:
product differentiation games MARKET COMPETITION integration INNOVATION EVOLUTION CHOICE MODEL
摘要:
When two countries starting from different quality levels (reflecting different conditions on domestic market demands) open to trade, two possible equilibria arise. In the first, the quality leader maintains its position. In the second, leapfrogging occurs. However, the latter is possible only if the initial quality gap is not too wide. Further, when the risk dominance criterion is used, only the former equilibrium is selected. These results suggest that initial conditions (such as domestic market size or home demand preferences) are important factors in determining relative competitiveness of firms in international markets.