Wage differentials, employer size, and unemployment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burdett, K; Mortensen, DT
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2527292
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 257-273
• 关键词: model

摘要

The unique equilibrium solution ts a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized. Wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed. The unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases: (i) identical workers and employers, (ii) identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices, and (iii) identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities.