Turnover externalities with marketplace trading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, MG
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00044
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 851-868
• 关键词: search equilibrium; sellers; money; auctions; prices

摘要

This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet costlessly. Since buyers have idiosyncratic match payoffs for each seller's good, some buyers, rather than trade with the current stock of sellers, wait for new sellers to enter the marketplace to obtain a good they like. A turnover externality exists where all traders are better off with higher entry rates of new traders. Furthermore, this turnover externality supports multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. This provides new insights into similar results obtained in the random-matching literature.