Dynamic contractual enforcement: A model of strikes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Robinson, JA
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00012
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 209-229
• 关键词: optimal labor contracts; rationalizable strategic behavior; implicit contracts; asymmetric information; repeated games; unemployment; equilibria; EMPLOYMENT; wages

摘要

This gaper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement. A firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce. If the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently, then, module discounting, the first-best is implementable, but strikes are always off the equilibrium path. If the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium. The dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes.