Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drugov, Mikhail
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.02.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 107-114
• 关键词: corruption; COMPETITION; bureaucracy; Red tape

摘要

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest, while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms' investment decisions. Additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats' rotation are provided. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.