Stochastic replicator dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabrales, A
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00071
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 451-481
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; evolutionary; Mutation; games; MODEL

摘要

This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dynamics, strategies that do not survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies are eliminated in the long run, even in the presence of nonvanishing perturbations. I also give an example that shows that the stochastic dynamics in this article have equilibrium selection properties that differ from other dynamics in the literature.