The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Janvry, Alain; McIntosh, Craig; Sadoulet, Elisabeth
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.09.008
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 173-188
• 关键词: credit markets; Credit bureau; asymmetric information; randomized experiment

摘要

We utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes. A Guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it. One year later, we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender. This pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market. Our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender, and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game. The credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones, increasing economic differentiation. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.