Do good workers hurt bad workers - Or is it the other way around?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moen, ER
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00089
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 779-800
• 关键词: equilibrium; EMPLOYMENT

摘要

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker-firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high-type workers, and too few high-type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high-type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high-type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low-type workers.