Collective choice and voluntary provision of public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Epple, D; Romano, R
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; National Bureau of Economic Research; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00080
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 545-572
• 关键词: private provision; impure altruism; Donations; expenditures; services

摘要

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.