Comparative learning dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergin, J; Bernhardt, D
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; City University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00132.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 431-465
• 关键词: long-run equilibria; EVOLUTION

摘要

We study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules comparative dynamics. We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population experience (imitative dynamics) and learning only from one's own experience (introspective dynamics). Paradoxically, for a broad class of models, comparing stochastically stable states across dynamics, agent payoffs are lower for imitative than introspective dynamics-mimicking best practice in the population is counterproductive.