The pricing of job characteristics when markets do not clear: Theory and policy implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lang, K; Majumdar, S
• 署名单位: Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00299.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1111-1128
• 关键词: labor

摘要

This article examines nonsequential search when jobs vary with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics. In the presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not show evidence of compensating wage differentials. The model also generates several pervasive features of labor markets: unemployment and vacancies, apparent discrimination, and market segmentation. When workers are homogeneous, restrictions on the range of job offers decrease welfare and cannot reduce unemployment. However, when workers have heterogeneous preferences, such restrictions may lower unemployment, and can even lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. We consider the impact of policies banning discrimination and regulating working conditions.