A model of bureaucracy and corruption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shi, S; Temzelides, T
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00290.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 873-908
• 关键词: exchange; money

摘要

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and lemons. Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.