Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
• 署名单位: Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Exeter; University of Birmingham
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00304.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1229-1261
• 关键词: simple axiomatization; expected utility; equilibrium; uncertainty; probability; beliefs

摘要

If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.