A theory of money and marketplaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsui, A; Shimizu, T
• 署名单位: Kansai University; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00309.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 35-59
• 关键词: search; MODEL; games

摘要

This article considers an infinitely repeated economy with divisible fiat money. The economy has many marketplaces that agents choose to visit. In each marketplace, agents are randomly matched to trade goods. There exist a variety of stationary equilibria. In some equilibrium, each good is traded at a single price, whereas in another, every good is traded at two different prices. There is a continuum of such equilibria, which differ from each other in price and welfare levels. However, it is shown that only the efficient single-price equilibrium is evolutionarily stable.