Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Wilson, John Douglas
• 署名单位: Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.009
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 68-76
• 关键词: Brain drain; tax; emigration; migration

摘要

This paper investigates the welfare effects of brain-drain taxes levied by non-benevolent governments, whereby a country collects a tax from skilled emigrants but potentially wastes a sizable portion of the revenue. Using a model in which taxes are chosen to maximize expected political rents. I show that the availability of a brain-drain tax increases a weighted sum of citizen utilities. However, the government's optimal brain-drain tax is found to be higher than the level that maximizes this weighted sum. In another model, a brain-drain tax is found to be desirable when governments use public good expenditures to compete for mobile residents. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.