Control allocation, revenue sharing, and joint ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, SS; Zhu, T
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00350.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 895-915
• 关键词: double moral-hazard; incomplete contracts; asset ownership; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; firm; COSTS

摘要

This article develops a two-period double moral hazard model with incomplete contracting to explore the implication of a possible adverse effect of unilateral control on the optimal revenue sharing and control allocation in a joint venture. We identify conditions under which joint ownership and control become optimal when unilateral control gives the controlling party opportunities to inefficiently extract private benefits at the expense of the joint revenue. Moreover, this adverse consequence of control may also lead to the separation of share ownership and control, i.e., it may be optimal for the minority owner to have the control rights.