Directed search on the job and the wage ladder

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delacroix, A; Shi, SY
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00392.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 651-699
• 关键词: equilibrium; unemployment; dispersion; EFFICIENCY; MODEL; differentials; INEQUALITY; mobility; WORKER; MARKET

摘要

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade-off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low-wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.