Incentive contracts and total factor productivity
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bental, Benjamin; Demougin, Dominique
署名单位：
University of Haifa; Humboldt University of Berlin
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00405.x
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1033-1055
关键词：
摘要：
We propose a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity (TFP). In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, productivity must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off marginal benefits and costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers' marginal disutility of effort, organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentives. Differences in these characteristics may explain cross-economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate the model's consistency with time-series and cross-country observations.
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