Social contracts, markets and efficiency: Groundwater irrigation in North India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerji, A.; Meenakshi, J. V.; Khanna, Gauri
• 署名单位: University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics; World Health Organization
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.07.005
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 228-237
• 关键词: Water markets; market structure; Social contracts; Water pricing

摘要

This paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that govern groundwater allocation in a sugarcane-cultivating village in North India. We find that, in contrast to earlier literature, the observed water trades result in efficient water allocation across farms. We interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a social contract using a simple bargaining model with limited inter-player transfers. Poor functioning of the power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint. Simulations show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields, and be financed out of increased farm profits. (C) 2011 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.