Efficient mechanisms for mergers and acquisitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Robinson, David T.; Viswanathan, S.
• 署名单位: Duke University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00452.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 995-1035
• 关键词: contingent payments; auctions; INFORMATION; valuation; MARKET; FIRMS

摘要

We characterize incentive-efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand-alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made contingent on the value of any new firm. When they can, we show that redistributing shares of any nonmerging firm generates information rents and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. When they cannot, private information undermines efficiency more when it concerns stand-alone values than synergies. Here, acquisitions emerge as optimal mechanisms.