Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belhaj, Mohamed; Deroian, Frederic
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.07.003
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 192-202
• 关键词: risk taking; Revenue sharing; social networks; systematic risk; Strategic substitutes

摘要

We examine the impact of informal risk sharing on risk taking incentives when transfers are organized through a social network. A bilateral partial sharing rule satisfies that neighbors share equally a part of their revenue. In such a society, correlated technologies generate interdependent risk levels. We obtain three findings. First, there is a unique and interior Nash-equilibrium risk profile, and it is in general differentiated and related to the Bonacich measure of the risk sharing network. Second, more revenue sharing enhances risk taking on average, although some agents may lower their risk level. Last, we find that under investment might often be observed. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.