NEGATIVE INTRA-GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belleflamme, Paul; Toulemonde, Eric
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Namur; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00529.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 245-272
• 关键词: competition; DISCRIMINATION

摘要

Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities.