CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duffy, John; Feltovich, Nick
• 署名单位: University of Aberdeen; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00598.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 701-721
• 关键词: credible assignments; recommended play; games; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; EVOLUTION

摘要

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third-party recommendations drawn from publicly announced distributions. We find that when recommendations are given, behavior differs from both a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and behavior without recommendations. In particular, subjects typically follow recommendations if and only if (1) those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium and (2) that correlated equilibrium is payoff-enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.