POLICY UNCERTAINTY, ELECTORAL SECURITIES, AND REDISTRIBUTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mattozzi, Andrea
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00570.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 45-71
• 关键词: social-mobility; income

摘要

This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy-contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no policy-insurance market is available. This implies that in economies with well-developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy-insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers.