COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH UNKNOWN COSTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chakrabarti, Subir K.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00616.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1209-1238
• 关键词: games

摘要

The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards In the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards Among these the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted Joint profits