DEBT NONNEUTRALITY, POLICY INTERACTIONS, AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Linnemann, Ludger; Schabert, Andreas
• 署名单位: Dortmund University of Technology
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00588.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 461-474
• 关键词: monetary-policy; budget deficits; public debt; rules

摘要

We study the consequences of nonneutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in a sticky-price model. Ricardian equivalence fails because debt has a negative impact on its rate of return and on private savings, which is induced by assuming transaction services of bonds. Under aggressive monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to be stabilized if nominal budget deficits are low. A smooth debt path limits inflation expectations, such that inflation variances can be reduced. Under a balanced budget policy, the central bank's output gap-inflation volatility trade-off is improved relative to an environment where debt is neutral.