MANAGED TRADE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hochman, Gal; Segev, Ella
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00576.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 187-211
• 关键词: discriminatory tariffs; COORDINATION; AGREEMENTS; PROTECTION; POLICY; wars

摘要

This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self-enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779-95) to account for current period uncertainty.