POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aronsson, Thomas; Johansson-Stenman, Olof
• 署名单位: Umea University; University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00611.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1071-1095
• 关键词: Public good provision; relative-income; Conspicuous consumption; easterlin paradox; happiness; POLICY; GOODS; redistribution; COMPETITION; jealousy

摘要

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two type OLG model when indi viduals relative consumption matters Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low ability type and the mimicker Under plausible empirical estimates the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low ability type becomes substantially smaller than in the conventional model In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption we also address within generation and upward comparisons