ASSET-BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rendahl, Pontus
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00699.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 743-770
• 关键词: liquidity; benefits; WEALTH

摘要

This article studies a model of consumption, savings, and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self-insurance. The government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individuals asset position, but not on her efforts of finding a job. To compensate for the impediments to self-insurance, benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing-constrained individuals with zero liquid funds. A quantitative exercise reveals that the U.S. unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor, but far too generous for wealthier individuals.