OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Judd, Kenneth L.; Schmedders, Karl; Yeltekin, Sevin
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00670.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 23-52
• 关键词: industrial-structure; market-structure; INNOVATION; prizes; LIFE

摘要

There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.