MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL-LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guillen, Pablo; Kesten, Onur
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1027-1046
• 关键词: School choice; house allocation; improving efficiency; Existing tenants; kidney exchange; STABILITY

摘要

We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem whose popular applications include on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice. We show that the so-called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well-known GaleShapley (GS) mechanism. We run two experiments comparing NH4 with the prominently advocated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and NH4 with GS. We find that under NH4, the participation rate is significantly higher than under TTC. Based on a new ordinal test of efficiency, NH4 is more likely to Pareto dominate TTC.