HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ino, Hiroaki; Matsumura, Toshihiro
• 署名单位: Kwansei Gakuin University; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00722.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1323-1340
• 关键词: research-and-development; free entry; Stackelberg; oligopoly; MARKET; welfare; COMPETITION; cournot; duopoly; MODEL

摘要

This article investigates the relationship between the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) and welfare in multiple-leader Stackelberg models. We formulate two long-run models of free entry of followers; in the first (second) model, leaders select their output before (after) the entry of the followers. We find that in both models, in contrast to the short-run models, the Stackelberg model yields a larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model does regardless of the number of leaders; that is, beneficial concentration always occurs.