EFFICIENT POLICY IN A PREDATORY ECONOMY: TO HIM WHO HATH SHALL BE GIVEN?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Anderson, James E.
署名单位：
Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00675.x
发表日期：
2012
页码：
157-174
关键词：
摘要：
Trade subject to predation generates externalities within and between markets. Efficient tax, infrastructure, and enforcement policies internalize the net externalitymore trade implies fewer predators but drawn to trade at rising cost. The balance is positive (negative) as enforcement is weak (strong). Dual economies pair weak Periphery and strong Core enforcement markets. Efficient taxation and infrastructure promote the Core at the expense of the Periphery. Efficient enforcement promotes both. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is efficient when Core enforcement is weak (strong). Tolerance of informal market Mafias that provide enforcement and infrastructure is efficient when Core enforcement is strong.
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