PEER TRANSPARENCY IN TEAMS: DOES IT HELP OR HINDER INCENTIVES?*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bag, Parimal Kanti; Pepito, Nona
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; ESSEC Business School
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1257-1286
• 关键词: provision

摘要

In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each others efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency eliminates the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.